Introduction
Over the last 2 decades, New Zealand's private sector industrial relations system has fragmented into a system in which bargaining takes place at a nu1nber of levels with markedly differing procedures and criteria which lead to several different kinds of agreements. It is important that a satisfactory classification scheme be established for the variety of agreements now negotiated, since each category signifies something very different about the nature of the bargaining between unions and employers. If wẽ leave to one side the vitally important area of unregistered agreements (which pose a different set of research problems), there is a general consensus that the classification syste1n used for registered agreements is unsatisfactory.
The most recent effort to construct an alternative classification system is that of A.J. Geare in an article in this journal : "Formal coUective agreements in New Zealand privatesector industrial relations '' (April 1983) . This brief comment on Gearẽ's article is divided into 2 parts : it is argued firstly, that Geare's analysis of settlement data is unacceptable and cannot be used to support the conclusions he draws; and secondly. , that analysis based upon his classification system Inisrepresents the nature of the bargaining process.
Aggregate settlement data
Before turning to Geare's classification system, some initial comments on his analysis of aggregate settlement data are called for. In his first table (p.25) Gẽare presents the aggregate nun1ber of arbitrated, conciliated and voluntary settlemẽnts for the years 1975-1981.. He observes that " Table 1 shows that, for 1979-1981, collective agreements (voluntary) form a much higher proportion of total collective agreements than they did in 1975-1977" (p.24) . In view of this statement, it is rather surprising that Geare gives only aggregate numbers without giving the proportions. Once the proportions are calculated by the reader, it is found that in the 1975-1977 period, 51 percent of total settlements were voluntary (excluding the 5 composite agreements in 1975}, while for the 1979-1981 period 59 percent were voluntary.
It is not clear why Geare concludes that the 59 percent figure for the 1979-1981 period constitutes a "n1uch higher proportion'" than the 51 percent figure for the period 1975-1977. To justify this conclusion Geare would need to offer a theory of the bargaining system that explained why a shift in the proportion of voluntary settlements from 51 percent to 59 percent should be considered significant. In the absence of such a theory, the claim that 59 percent constitutes a ''much higher proportion" than 51 percent remains purely a matter for debate, and a fruitless debate at that.
A more fundamental problem is that Geare offers no explanations as to why the data were grouped and analysed in this eay. Consequently, the groupings appear to be entirely arbitrary rather than being informed by any theoretical considerations. Fluctuations such as these are con1pletely obscured by an analysis based upon grouped data. By ignoring annual variations, tnisleading conclusions can be drawn about nonexistent trends. As Shalev observes in a con1ment upon Hibbs' {1978) analysis of strike trends since 1900, " ... in all countries the occurrence of extreme fluctuations, however occasional, 1nakes the use of periodized data a hazardous venture" (Shalev, 1978, p.438) . These hazards loom even larger in analyzing a 7 year period that exhibits such striking annual fluctuations. Thus, Geare's . conclusion that there has been an apparently significant increase in the proportion of voluntary settle1nents is not supported by a more appropriate method of analysis. Geare's alternative classification system and its application to 1980 is shown in Table  2 . Clearly there is, as Geare points out, a need to distinguish between arbitrated and conciliated awards, and the failure of the present classification system to do this is inexcusable. This paper is concerned with Geare 's distinction between principal and supplementary agreements, and his analysis based on that. Geare argues (p.24) that voluntary settlen1ents should be classified into principal and supplementary documents, and that when this is done, the trend towards voluntary settlements which he has observed (but which the analysis above casts doubt upon) is shown in a new light. Geare defines a principal docun1ent as one "'which stands by itself \Vith regard to questions governing the work environ1nent" (p.24). A supplementary document "is one which is the authority for only a sn1all proportion of rules and n1ust be read in conjunction with a principal docun1ent'' (p.24). He argues that if a large proportion of voluntary agreements are supplen1entary docu1nents, then we cannot conclude that there is a trend away fron1 conciliation towards independence for negotiators and the development of genuine voluntary negotiations.
Geare then classifies agreen1ents in 1980 into principal and supplementary docutnents, r and concludes that "in 1980, at any rate , a large proportion of collective agreements were supplen1entary'~ (p.24). In fact, as Geare's O\Vn data (reproduced in Geare's analysis It should be notẽd that the principal/supplen1entary document distinction itself may offer a fruitful basis for analysis, and indeed Law ( 1981) has used a similar classification systen1 to analyse the distribution of particular provisions across national, principal and suppletnentary docun1ents. The tnajor objection here is to the analysis which Geare tnakes, based upon his classification systen1.
~lowever, it is itnportant to be precise about the status of VCAs, whether principal or supplen1entary, and the relationship between the two kinds of VCAs. Geare observes (p.24) that a supplen1entary agreetnent n1ust be read in conjuction with a principal agreenlent for those tnatters not included in the supplen1entary agreen1ent. This is quite true, but, it should be pointed out that a supple1nentary VCA cannot be read in conjunction with a principal VCA, but only with an award. A VCA cannot refer back to (or '~.super impose on") another VCA. It should also be noted that a VCA, by virtue of section 65 (8) of the Industrial Relations Act, supersedes any award that might otherwise apply. This means that it is possible for a VCA to set tenns which are inferior to those in the award. Exan1ples of this are rare but not unknown. As noted above, Geare concludes that the proliferation of suppletnentary agree1nents that settle only a stnall nutnber of issues cannot support any conclusion about a shift towards genuine voluntary negotiations and the independence of negotiators. This involves an assutnption that all issues in an agreetnent are of equal significance in its negotiation, and that we can learn son1ething fron1 counting the nun1ber of issues settled in an agreenlent. But all issues are not born equal. Many are settled before any negotiation takes place and typically "negotiation" involves their ritualistic insertion into the agree1nent. So1ne are prescribed by statute -hours of work, the tern1 of the agreement, public holidays, annual holidays, certain safety standards, right of entry for union officials, disputes of right procedures, and personal grievance procedures, 3 while others are prescribed by custom and practice that leave very little flexibility for negotiators -the unqualified preference clause , payment of wages , stnokos, meal breaks, overtime rates etc. In practice, the nu1n ber of issues that are actually negotiated n1ay be quite sn1all. Of those that are negotiated, the crucial issues are usually those concerning basic wage rates and allowances, and in the negotiation of tnost awards and agreen1ents these are heavily influenced by the pattern set in the trendsetting awards (Bradford, 1983 ).
Thus we learn nothing of any significance about the autonon1y of negotiators fron1 counting the nun1ber of issues settled in an agreen1ent. The autonon1y of negotiators can only be assessed by evaluating the substance of the issues settled. Where negotiators of any agree1nent -be it -'principal" or "supplen1entary" -negotiate tenns that depart fro1n the prevailing trend, then we 1nay speak of their autonomy. , regardless of the number of clauses in the agreetnent. This is particularly so where the negotiators depart from prevailing trends in settling the crucial issues of wages and allowances, or other issues that 1nay 2 Con1pare the provisions for \vages and allowances in the I nvercargill City, Gore Borough, Bluff Borough, Gardeners, Labourers and Other \Vorkers VCAs in 1979 and 1980 (Book of Awards, 79, 7271; and 80, 7117) with the Ne\v Zealand (with exceptions) Local Bodies Gardeners, Labourers and General \Vorkers A\vards of those years (Book of Awards, 79, 5775; and 80, 1569) . Although the tenns of the documents are not precisely the same, in each year the VCA was registered after the a\vard and contained rates inferior to the award. The net effect was that for several months in each year, the workers covered by the VCA were paid at below-award rates. It is possible that as employer opposition to the award system grows, employers may co1ne to view this as an effective strategy to impose belo\v-award conditions.
3 Of course these issues are not entirely removed from the realm of bargaining. For example, where the normal working week goes beyond the prescribed 40 hours, the parties will need to negotiate the appropriate terms of employment. Alternatively, some unions may seek to improve upon the terms prescribed by the legislation, such as by obtaining an extra week's holiday after a specified period of service with the long-term aim of eventually securing a change to the legislation. In the area of disputes and grievance procedures, the legislation makes alternative grievance and disputes procedures possible, but Miller's analysis suggests that the vast majority of agreements follow the procedure in the legislation (1983 , p . . 8) . Thus the bargaining situation is always fluid, and particular agreements Inay depart marginally or, more rarely, significantly from the tenns prescribed by statute. However, at a general level, direct challenges to statutorily prescribed terms of employment are not a pronlinent feature of the system. (for instance even the celebrated "evasions" in the 1970s of statutorily prescribed \Vage levels were usually conducted by means of the legally permitted safety valves of "serious anomalies" or "exceptional circumstances".) Registered coUective agreements 201 be significant at a particular time, such as redundancy payments in the mid-1970s. Consequently, if suppletnentary agreen1ents involve terms of en1ployment that depart from prevailing trends, especially on significant issues, then they are very in1portant documents indeed, and their proliferation would indicate precisely that growing independence of negotiators that Geare argues against. Since Geare's counting n1ethod tells us nothing about the substance of the rules in 1nost supplen1entary documents, we cannot be certain whether this is the case or not. l~owever, Geare does observe that a large number of supple: mentary documents in l 980 were negotiated by the Engine-Drivers Union, and involved "improved service and shift allowances, meal money and extra n1onies for particular working conditions" (p.26). These agreen1ents also settled the basic wage rate for the workers covered by the1n. This suggests that these supple1nentary documents concerned precisely those issues that are the essence of negotiations.
This conclusion is further supported when we consider that the 1980 Engine-Drivers' agreements were the continuation of a campaign begun by the union in 1979 to secure both these payn1ents and the registration allowance for boiler-attendants through voluntary agreen1ents. In announcing the house agreement campaign, the vice-president of the union stated that the award had beco1ne ahnost irrelevant to the union as it covered only 25 percent of the 1nen1bership, and set a basic rate of $3 .2~0 per hour compared with an Auckland freezing industry ruling rate of $4.7 l per hour (Evening Post, 10 January 1979}. If anything then, it is the award which is the ''supple1nentary" agree1nent in this case, with house agreements settling the most ilnportant issues, including the basic wage rate, and the award settling those other issues for which the scope of negotiation is severely constrained by legislation or custo1n. The union embarked upon this strategy w]}en the Govenunent threatened to issue regulations preventing the negotiation of these payments in the award. The campaign gathered further tnomentuin in 1980 when the Government did issue regulations under the Ren1.uneration Act to detern1ine the tenns of the award. It seems reasonable to conclude that the successful campaign by the Engine-Drivers Union to negotiate certain payments through voluntary agreements (''supplementary docuInents") in the face of threatened and then actual governn1ent regulation constitutes a remarkable degree of independence on the part of the negotiators, and a significant shift away fro1n conciliation and towards genuine voluntary negotiations.
It is also important to point out that Geare's supplementary agreen,ent category contains a heterogenous group of documents. As he points out (p . . 27), another largẽ group of these agree1nents that were negotiated in 1980 included those negotiated by the Canterbury Clerical Workers Union, in whjch the only variation frotn the national award was the provision for the autotnatic deduction of union subscriptions fron1 workers' wages. These docutnents involved procedural n1atters, and were very different frotn those negotiated by the Engine-Drivers Union which established 1najor variations from the award on substantive n1atters. If the principal /supplementary agreen1ent distinction is to be useful, it needs to distinguish between procedural and substantive agreements. Clearly the reasons for the negotiation of the Clerical Workers' agreen1ents were quite different fro1n those that led the Engine-Drivers into their agree1nents, and each signifies so1nething different about the industrial relations syste1n. A classification system wltich classifies them as one honlogenous category ignores this, and misrepresents the bargaining process.
The Engine-Drivers' house agree1nent catnpaign further illustrates Geare's failure to take full account of the reasons why one kind of agreen1ent is negotiated rather than anotl}er. Geare analyses this simply in tem1s of a 2-party relationship in which union and employer preference for a particular kind of agreen1ent can be understood in terms of their strategic evaluation of such variables as the blanket clause, the concentration of union mẽmbership, the degree of membership cohesion and loyalty, and employer differences in profitability, amenability to voluntary agreen1ents and tnode of operation (p.27-7). But the predominant characteristic of the bargaining system in the period under consideration was that it was a 3-party relationship involving almost continuous State intervention, or threatened intervention. The bargaining choices that unions and employers make, and the corresponding changes in the types of settlements reached must be analysed in terms of this historical These problems are illustrated more vividly in Geare's discussion of composite agreeInents, where he argues that the choice to adopt or not adopt the composite agreement option is determined by the simplicity of the procedure for its negotiation. He states that:
The pnrpose of the composite agreement is to substitute one agreement for many, on a major project or in a major concern. The concept was introduced in 1962 but did not prove popular as the procedure then specified was complex (in contrast to the simplified procedure introduced in the 1973 legislation] (p. 2 7).
A number of objections can be made to this. First, the "concept'' of a composite agreement was not "introduced" in 1962. The legislation setting out a procedure for their negotiation was enacted in 1962, but the concept was "introduced" at least a decade earlier with the negotiation of a comprehensive agreement at the Roxburgh hydro-electric site in 1952 and the negotiation of comprehensive (composite) agreements at other major sites such as Mere-Mere, Kawerau, and Marsden Point in subsequent years. Secondly, Geare's account of the "purpose" of a composite agreement is simply a
formal statement of what a co1nposite agreement is and actually says nothing at all about its purpose. The composite agreement constitutes a rationalisation of the bargaining structure on major sites for the purpose of overcoming the problems posed for management by 1nultiple agreements. These problems involved firstly the inappropriateness of awards or agreements negotiated outside the site for the settlement of issues which arose out of the very different employment conditions on site. Secondly, the existence of multiple agreements with the numerous unions on site, posed management with constant pressure from the different unions to grant terms more favourable than those enjoyed by other unions. This pressure led to a ratcheting upwards of wages, allowances and conditions on site and to a disturbance of existing relativities which had implications for sub-contractors on site and for employers outside. Thus the provision for composite agreements in the 1962 Act was an employer-initiated proposal which unions strongly opposed from when it was first suggested in the mid-1950s until it was finally enacted in 1962. Its purpose was to overcome the problems for employers posed by a fragmented bargaining structure, which, in turn, was a consequence of the fragmented union structure imposed by industrial legislation.
Geare's argument that composite agreements did not prove popular in the 1960s because the procedure was complex is equally misleading. In fact, composite agreements were initially unpopular with unions after the 1962 legislation because they were viewed as a government/employer strategy to eliminate a bargaining leverage for unions, and because they were seen as a threat to union autonomy. This latter factor was particularly important in the negotiation of composite agreements after 1962. The unions had agreed to the comprehensive agreements of the 1950s on sites such as Roxburgh where the vast majority of workers were covered by the New Zealand Workers Union, and on other sites where they were settled in direct bargaining outside the arbitration system. But on sites where 1nany unions had a significant presence, efforts to impose a composite agreement within the arbitration system triggered union resistance against a dictated bargaining procedure, sparked intense inter-union conflict over jurisdictional matters, and led to bitter accusations that the agreement negotiated was less favourable than an individual union had already negotiated elsewhere, or would have negotiated on the project if left to negotiate alone. Indeed, the negotiation of the Manapouri composite agreement in 1963 involved fierce union clashes at Arbitration Court hearings, appeals to higher courts, a decision by the Workers Union to withdraw from the FOL (subsequently reversed) and frequent or.
Registered collective agreements 203 inter-union conferences to settle the intense conflicts that had been generated. 6 Unions attitudes slowly changed as they adjusted then1selves to a co-operative bargaining strategy, resolved the jurisdictional conflicts, and began to realize that the capital-intensive nature of major projects permitted the negotiation of very favourable terms of employment. These could be used to put pressure on other employers, through the house bargaining strategy discussed above. These changes, combined with the rather obvious fact that there were more major projects and large manufacturing concerns in the 1970s than in the 1960s, help explain the greater number of composite agreements in the 1970s as much, if not more than Geare's emphasis on the sin1plified procedures set out in the 1973legislation.
However, the problems associated with composite agree1nents have not been entirely overcome as Albury (1983) , writing in the san1e symposium as Geare, illustrates with his analysis of the maritime composite agreement. Indeed Albury's analysis, which is finnly grounded in an explanation of the particular union/employer/government relations in the maritime industry, contributes more to an understanding of industrial relations than does Geare's formal and ahistorical sweep across the board canvas.
Conclusion
The construction of categories exercises a strong influence upon subsequent research, and directs attention to certain questions and areas rather than others. We perceive and understand the world by n1eans of the categories we look through, and if they are developed in isolation froJn the real world, subsequent research based upon them will be silnilarly isolated. Thus Geare's classification system would categorise the Engine-Drivers' award as a principal docun1ent that "stands alone". But it only stands alone because the iinportant matters are settled elsewhere. Secondly, fully half of his article comes under the heading "The choice of agree1nents", where he quite properly attempts to explain why different kinds of agreements are chosen rather than others. Without this, his classification syste1n would "stand alone" as an atheoretical exercise divorced from the explanation of the real world of industrial relations. Unfortunately, his analysis of the process of choice is inadequate.
